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USE OF SUBPOENAS IN LABOR 
ARBITRATION: STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
Mary A. Bedikiant 
INTRODUCTION 
The expansive and pervasive use of labor arbitration as a means 
of effectively countering industrial strife has generated some proce-
dural problems which need to be addressed. 1 One of many such 
problems is the utilization of formal discovery devices in the arbi-
tral forum, namely the subpoena. 
This Article will analyze the interface between the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (United States ArbItration Act), the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, and the Michigan arbitration statute, in order to deter-
mine whether certain formal discovery procedures are, in fact, 
within the ambit of arbitral authority, and if so, to what extent. 
Germane to this analysis is whether the basis underlying. the re-
quest to invoke the formal procedures is evidentiary in nature, or 
strictly for discovery purposes, as is typically perceived. 
Additionally, a distinction will be drawn between common law 
arbitration and statutory arbitration, with the latter providing the 
gravamen for much of the development of procedural and substan-
tive law in the area of labor arbitration. It will be shown that the 
arbitrator who hears a labor dispute pursuant to common law prin-
t B.A., M.A., Wayne State Univ.; J.D., expected June 1980; the author ia currently the 
Regional Director of the American Arbitration Association in Detroit, Michigan. 
1. The increase of labor arbitration cases processed, as reported by the American Arbi-
tration Association, Federal Mediation and Circulation Service and the Michigan Employ-
ment Relations Commission, stems, in part, from increased union vulnerability to damage 
suits for failing to represent employees fairly, and greater reliance upon a more expedient 
grievance resolution system. 
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ciples has less discretion to exercise relative to invoking formal dis-
covery procedures. Principally, this is because the parameters of 
common law arbitral authority are derived essentially from the 
terms of the submission agreement, and the applicability of exter-
nal laws becomes ostensibly limited. 
Finally, a discussion will be had pertaining to the relative merits 
of whether labor arbitrators should actively, on their own initiative 
or at the request of a party, engage in the exercise of formal dis-
covery procedures. An explanation of the prevailing schools of 
thought will be proffered. Support for their existence will include 
the opinions of distinguished labor arbitrators whose views have 
heretofore not been publicly expressed. In addition, having recog-
nized the increasing number of collective relationships, both in the 
public and private sectors, the potential for generating increased 
arbitral involvement in discovery requests, an assessment will be 
made as to expected future arbitral conduct. 
I. COMPULSORY PROCESS UNDER COMMON LAW ARBITRATION 
A distinction can be made between common law arbitration and 
modern statutory arbitration as it relates to the use of discovery 
procedures within the arbitral forum. The mere existence of an ar-
bitration statute does not guarantee the most efficient and expedi-
ent use of arbitration for the settlement of collective bargaining 
disputes, if the law does not embody or mandate features of mod-
ern arbitration practice. The arbitration statute which is well 
grounded in common law vestiges does not recognize the validity of 
future dispute resolution and thereby reduces the element of cer-
tainty which is otherwise attached to third-party resolution.1 
2. Those states which have modern arbitration statutes include: Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. §§ 
09.43.010 to .180 (1973); Arizona, ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 12·1501 to 1518 (Supp. 1957·1979); 
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34·511 to 532 (Supp. 1979); California, CAL. CIV. Paoc. CODE 
§§ 1280·95 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52·408 to 424 
(West 1960); Delaware, DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 5701·5725 (1975); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
682.01·.22 (West Supp. 1979); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7·201 to 224 (1973); Hawaii, HAW. 
REV. STAT. §§ 658·1 to 15 (1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 7·901 to 922 (1979); Illinois, ILL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 19·30, 101·123 (1975 & Supp. 1979); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-
1-1 to 2·22 (Burns 1973); Kansas, KAN. STAT. §§ 5-201 to 422 (1975); Louisiana, LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 9-4201 to 4236 (West 1951 & Supp. 1951-1979); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, 
§§ 5927-5949 (1980); Maryland, MD. CTS. & JUD. Paoc. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 234 (1974); 
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (West Supp. 1979); Michigan, MICH. 
COMPo LAWS AN~. §§ 600.5001·.5035 (1976 & Supp. 1979); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
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The distinction between common law and statutory arbitration 
also includes the composition and election of the arbitral board, 
the conduct of the hearing, and matters relating to enforcement 
and implementation of the award. In common law arbitration 
these procedures are, by and large, governed by judge-made com-
mon law rules.3 While statutory arbitration prescribes formalities, 
and requires a written submission of the dispute in controversy, at 
common law it has been held that even an oral agreement and a 
subsequently rendered oral award are adequate.· 
Common law arbitration had its genesis prior to the rapid union-
ization of America as a means of resolving existing controversies. 
The concept of common law arbitration has been construed as 
follows: 
[W]hen the courts have no written law [constitution or statute] on which 
to base its decision in a particular controversy, it decides the case on the 
basis of custom and general principles of right and wrong. These deci-
sions create precedents or rules, which are applied to similar future con-
troversies. The body of law created in this fashion is spoken of as the 
common law.G 
Elkouri and Elkouri in their book, How Arbitration Works, pro-
vide a general summary of what common law arbitration entails: 
Common law arbitration rests upon the 'Voluntary agreement of the par-
ties to submit their dispute to an outsider. The submission agreement 
572.08-.30 (West Supp. 1980); Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 38.015-.205 (1973); New Hamp-
shire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 542.1-.10 (1974); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§2A:24-1 to 
11 (West 1952); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to 22 (1978); New York, N.Y. CIV. 
PRAC. LAw §§ 7501-7514 (Consol. 1963); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1.567.1-.20 
(Supp. 1979); Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.24 (Page 1954 & Supp. 1979); 
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (West Supp. 1979); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. 
§§ 33.210-.340 (1977); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to 20 (1970); South Carolina, 
S.C. CODE §§ 15-48-10 to 240 (Supp. 1979); South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-
25A-1 to 38 (1978); Texas, TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 224-249 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 
1979); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31-1 to 22 (1977); Virginia, VA. CODE §§ 8.01-577 to 581 
(1977); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-.220 (1961); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 298.01-.18 (West 1958); Wyoming, WYo. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to 119 (1977). 
3. See Sturges & Reckson, Common Law and Statutory Arbitration: Problems Arising 
From Their Coexistence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 819 (1962). See generally F. ELKOURI & E. 
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 36 (3rd ed. 1973). 
4. Common law arbitration requires certain submissions and awards to be in writing to 
comply with the Statutes of Frauds. Walden v. McKinnon, 157 Ala. 291, 47 So. 874 (1908); 
Cutler v. Cutler, 169 N.C. 482, 86 S.E. 301 (1915). See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION AND AWARDS §§ 69-75 (1930). 
5. S. KAGEL, ANATOMY OF A LABOR ARBITRATION 139 (1961). 
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may be oral and may be revoked at any time before the rendering of the 
award . . . . The arbitrators have no power to subpoena witnesses or 
records and need not conform to legal rules of hearing procedure other 
than to give the parties an opportunity to present all competent evidence 
8 
It should be noted that the existence of common law often is 
viewed as supplementing rather than supplanting existing statu-
tory law.' While discussing the impact of a common law arbitration 
statute, the Supreme Court of Indiana noted: 
The statute in no manner affects submissions which were valid at com-
mon law. It is an affirmative statute without negative words, and in no 
respect are its provisions of such a nature that they cannot have effect 
consistently with the validity of parol submissions. Such submissions 
were valid at common law, and as there is nothing in the statute which 
expressly, or by necessary implication, changes the law as it previously 
existed upon that subject, they are still valid. The statute is merely 
cumulative.8 
Further support for this position is found in numerous judicial 
opinions. In 1898, in referencing an arbitration statute then in ef-
fect, the Colorado courts stated with equal cogency: 
We think that the sole object of the Code provisions as to arbitration and 
awards was to obviate the necessity of bringing a suit to enforce the 
award. They provided that, if a certain prescribed method was pursued 
in the submission of controversies in arbitration, the award in writing 
might be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county 
wherein the matter was pending and judgment be entered thereon. The 
act did not undertake either in terms or by implication to abolish com-
mon-law arbitrations. Both forms of procedure may exist as neither 
conflicts with the other.· 
Although the view of most courts is that arbitration statutes do not 
displace or foreclose the activation of common law machinery, 
opinions to this posture have surfaced.10 
6. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 36; see also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 
LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER STATE STATUTES 3 (M. Ziskind ed. 1943). 
7. See Sturges & Reckson, supra note 3, at 826; see also M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3.02 (1968). 
8. Miller v. Goodwine, 29 Ind. 46, 47 (1867). 
9. McClelland v. Hammond, 12 Colo. App. 82, 84-85, 64 P. 538, 539 (1898) (emphasis 
added). 
10. One such minority view was advanced by the Washington Supreme Court in Dickie 
Mfg. Co. v. Sound Constr. & Eng. Co., 92 Wash. 316, 159 P. 129 (1916). The court stated: 
"[i]n the face of so complete an act as ours we are clear, and find this proper occasion to say, 
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Subpoena power of an arbitrator in a common law proceeding, 
where the arbitral authority is primarily derived from the four cor-
ners of the submission agreement, is limited at best. Aided only by 
a dearth of common law cases, courts which have propounded a 
juristic philosophy in this regard have held that an arbitrator's au-
thority in such procedural matters is either unduly restrictive or 
virtually non-existent. In Tobey v. County of Bristol,l1 the court 
noted: 
arbitrators, at the common law, possess no authority whatsoever, even to 
administer an oath, or to compel the attendance of witnesses. They can-
not compel the production of documents, and papers and books of ac-
count, or insist upon a discovery of facts from the parties under oath. 
They are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of 
law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated cases; and 
hence it has often been said, that the judgment of arbitrators is but rus-
ticum judicum.'2 
The exception appears in those instances where arbitration is 
under the rule of the court, and where authority of the court and 
its officials is available to enforce subpoenas or orders of the 
arbitrators. 13 
Judge-made law requires the arbitrator to afford the parties an 
ample and fair opportunity to present the evidentiary material, but 
does not concomitantly establish a separate power to subpoena 
witnesses or require the production of pertinent records and 
materials to aid in the resolution of the controversy. It follows, 
given the constraints which prevail in a common law setting, that 
an arbitrator could only exericise this latter prerogative if such au-
thority was granted by both parties and not revoked prior to its 
exercise, or where a state has codified the common law so as to 
authorize the arbitrator to issue subpoenas. 
that common law arbitration does not exist in this state and that the plain purpose of our 
legislation was to clear much unsettled practice by codifying arbitration." [d. at 318, 159 P. 
at 131. 
11. 23 F. Cas. 1313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Case No. 14,065). 
12. [d. at 1321 (emphasis added). 
13. See Paine v. Kentucky Ref. Co., 159 Ky. 270, 167 S.W. 375 (1914). The Kentucky 
Court of Appeals spoke to the collateral issue of arbitral compensation where services were 
rendered pursuant to a common law arbitration agreeinent. The court held that such an 
arbitration agreement, silent as to compensation, permitted arbitrators, under the theory of 
implied contract, to recover reasonable compensation for services requested and rendered. 
[d. at 282-83, 167 S.W. at 378-80. 
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II. COMPULSORY PROCESS IN MODERN STATUTORY LABOR 
ARBITRATION 
A. Judicial Origins and Development of Federal Procedural Law 
in Labor Arbitration 
Modern statutory labor arbitration percolated into the industrial 
mainstream in the late 1920's and 1930's as a response to the rapid 
unionization of major industries. The first 'such arbitration statute 
was enacted by the New York Legislature." Clearly distinguishable 
from earlier statutes, it encouraged the resolution of future contro-
versies, in addition to existing controversies. III 
Subsequent to the passage of the New York arbitration statute, 
Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act in order to 
provide a statutory mechanism for enforcing agreements to arbi-
trate labor disputes arising in industries affecting interstate com-
merce.16 Jurisdictional criteria and statutory bases upon which in-
tercession of such disputes were established. It was the intent of 
Congress, vis-a-vis the Act, to allow minimal judicial intercession, 
to preclude ultra vires arbitral conduct where a valid agreement to 
arbitrate did not exist, and to establish parameters for the scope of 
judicial review.1'7 
Dispute initially existed as to whether the Act applied to collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Section 1 of the Act specifically pro-
vides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
14. Albeit the New York law was enacted in 1920 prior to a more formidable displace-
ment of common law arbitration, the statute clearly embraced not only agreements of sub-
mission of existing controversies but agreements to arbitrate grievances arising in the fu-
ture. Both classifications included elements of irrevocability and judicial enforceability, 
thereby passing into disuse common law revocation by notice. The original New York arbi-
tration statute was enacted as N.Y. Laws 1920, ch. 925, art. 83 §§ 1410-31; the current ver-
sion is located at N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (Conso!. 1963). 
15. See Sturges & Reckson, supra note 3, at 822. According to the authors, general arbi-
tration statutes with various modifications of the New York statute, were enacted in Nevada 
(1925), North Carolina (1927), and Utah (1927). These general statutes, as initially emerged 
in draft form, recognized agreements of submission on existing disputes. A new draft, 
adopted in 1955 and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
Laws, extended recognition to include arbitration of future controversies and claims. 
Sturges & Reckson, supra note 3, at 822 n.9. See also M. DOMKE, supra note 7, at § 4.01. 
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1977). 
17. See M. DOMKE, supra note 7 at § 4.03. 
HeinOnline -- 1979 Det. C.L. Rev. 581 1979
1979] Subpoenas in Labor Arbitratian 581 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. "18 A split of 
authority occurred as a consequence of Justice Frankfurter's dis-
sent in the landmark case of Textile Workers Union of America v. 
Lincoln Mills of Alabama,ll1 in which he argued that the majority's 
decision to enforce labor arbitration agreements was reached by 
primary reliance upon section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act,IO and not the United States Arbitration Act, thus consti-
tuting a silent rejection of the applicability of the United States 
Arbitration Act.l1 Neither Frankfurter's dissent nor the current 
trend of federal court decisions support the position that the Court 
per se impliedly rejected the applicability of the United States Ar-
bitration Act to collective bargaining agreements; rather the 
Court's utilization and reliance upon the non-statutory· body of 
federal substantive law, lacking in section 301, was sufficient to 
reach the desired goal of enforcing the arbitration provision. II 
Further enlightenment on this issue was provided in Pietro 
Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 
No. 150.18 In that case, the employer asserted that the collective 
bargaining agreement was a contract of employment within the 
meaning of section 1 of the Act, and ergo, the arbitration provi-
sions were inapplicable. The court held that facts concerning the 
merits of a particular controversy must be found by the arbitra-
tor;l. the exclusion, on the other hand, specifically related to work-
ers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. III 
18. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
19. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1976). 
21. 353 U.S. at 460-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
22. See Rushfield, Federal Discovery in Aid of Labor Arbitration, 459 Ar. IV-3 at 2 
(1976) (unpublished article in the Library of the American Arbitration Association (AAA». 
23. 351 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965). 
24. [d. at 579-80. 
25. See Tenney Engine Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Amer. Local 437, 
207 F.2d 450 (1953). The interpretation that contracts of employment of persons engaged in 
interstate commerce excluded arbitration systems of collective bargaining agreements was 
given continued force and effect in Newark Stereotypers Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning 
Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 596, n.2 (3rd Cir. 1968), and International Ass'n of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers v. General Electric Co., 406 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 (2nd Cir. 1969). Section 
2 of the Act states: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing contro-
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The utilization of the United States Arbitration Act in a '''collec-
tive" milieu has received further recognition by the federal judici-
ary,se Most recently, in Local Lodge 1746, International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Pratt & Whitney 
Division of United Aircraft Corporation,2'1 a United States District 
Court in Connecticut held that pursuant to the court's concurrent 
enforcement jurisdiction regarding arbitration proceedings, it was 
cloaked with sufficient power to order the production of disputed 
documents for in camera inspection by the arbitrator/as 
The United States Arbitration Act permits parties to collective 
bargaining agreements to rely upon the Act to predicate suits to 
compel arbitration. When section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act came into existence, confusion reigned within the 
lower federal courts as to which of the two acts conferred jurisdic-
tion.29 In Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court held that section 301 
versy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2. Narrow construction of this language has resulted in the proposition that the 
United States Arbitration Act applies to collective bargaining agreements and to suits upon 
such agreements so long as the affected employees are not engaged in the transportation 
industries. 
26. See Heinsz, Lowry, & Torzewski, The Subpoena Power of Labor Arbitrators, 1979 
UTAH L. REv. 29, 44. 
27. 329 F. Supp. 283 (D. Conn. 1971). 
28. 1d. at 286. 
29. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1977), au-
thorizes suits in federal court for violation of collective agreements in industries affecting 
interstate commerce without respect to amount or diversity of citizenship. The applicable 
section of the Act reads: 
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court 
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the 
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Looking to the legislative history of section 301, it should be noted that 
both the House and the Senate expressed concern about the failure to abide by a collective 
bargaining agreement. This concern manifested itself originally in the form of designating 
such contractual violations as a basis for filing an unfair labor charge with the National 
Labor Relations Board. This feature was subsequently excluded from the law. The House 
Conference Report states U[o)nce parties have made a collective bargaining contract, the 
enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the 
National Labor Relations Board." H. R. CONF. REP. No. 510, BOth Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), 
reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 
1947 at 546 (1948). 
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authorized the federal courts to fashion a body of law for the en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreement provisions for arbi-
tration.80 The court further identified section 301 as the primary 
source of substantive law; state law could be resorted to only if 
deemed to be compatible with the intent and purpose of section 
301. 81 In the event state law applied, it would not constitute an 
independent source of private rights. 
Nurtured by a congressional policy favoring the enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate disputes arising within industries affecting 
commerce, the United States Arbitration Act was relegated to serv-
ing a supplemental role in the development of both procedural and 
substantive law. The Act was not displaced by the emerging fed-
eral law being developed pursuant to section 301; but rather 
deemed compatible with section 301, and to that extent, consid-
ered a procedural source in arbitral jurisprudence. 
B. Enactment of the United States Arbitration Act 
The United States Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925 in re-
sponse to increased unionization within the private sector.82 An ad-
ditional force that prompted its passage was an increased refusal 
on the part of employers and labor organizations in industries 
affecting commerce, to abide by the terms of agreements to arbi-
trate labor disputes or to honor awards issued thereunder. The Act 
applies to arbitrations concerning transactions of enterprises en-
gaged in, or affecting interstate commerce, and any maritime 
transactions.88 Section 7 of the Act speaks to the area of discovery 
and provides a grant of authority to the arbitrator to issue a sub-
poena, non-compliance of which could culminate in contempt.8• 
30. 353 u.s. 448, 456 (1957). 
31. Id. at 457. 
32. Originally enacted as Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883. The 
current version is found at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). 
33. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
34. Section 7 of the Act provides in pertinent part: 
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or otherwise, or a major-
ity of them, may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of 
them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, re-
cord, document or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case 
. . .. Said summons shall issue in the name of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a 
majority of them ... and shall be directed to the said person and shall be served 
in the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before the court; if any 
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Whether this provision for discovery becomes operative, turns 
upon the existence of a judicial proceeding collateral to the arbi-
tration proceeding to enforce the arbitration agreement. Examples 
of such proceedings include matters which involve a stay of an ac-
tion brought on an arbitrability issue,811 confirmation of an arbitral 
award,86 and compelling the parties to arbitration.S'1 Courts have 
unanimously held that a collateral judicial proceeding for the en-
forcement of an agreement to arbitrate, or for the enforcement of 
an arbitral award, or vacatur thereof, falls under the rubric of the 
United States Arbitration Act, and ergo, Rule 81(a)(3)88 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure becomes applicable. The opera-
tive part of the federal rule provides that in proceedings relating to 
arbitration, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "apply only to 
the extent that matters of procedure are not provided for in those 
statutes. "89 
person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said sum-
mons, upon petition the United States district court for the district in which such 
arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may compel the attendance of such 
person or persons before said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person or 
persons for contempt in the same manner provided by law for securing the attend-
ance of witnesses or their punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts 
of the United States. 
9 U.S.C. § 7. 
35. [d. at § 3. 
36. [d. at § 9. 
37. [d. at § 4. See Rushfield, 8upra note 22, at 5. 
38. Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc. v. Local 337, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 363 F. 
Supp. 1351 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 
20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(3) provides in pertinent part that: 
In proceedings under title 9, U.S.C., relating to arbitration, or ... relating to 
boards of arbitration of railway labor disputes, these rules apply only to the extent 
that matters of procedure are not provided for in those statutes. These rules apply 
to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in 
accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States 
under any statute. . . or by rules of the district court or by order of the court in 
the proceedings. 
Once applicability is determined, Rule 45(a) designates procedure 88 follows: 
Every subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the court, shall state 
the name of the court and the title of the action, and shall command each person 
to whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at a time and place therein 
specified. The clerk shall issue a subpoena, or a subpoena for the production of 
documentary evidence, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank, to a party re-
questing it, who shall fill it in before service. 
Rule 45(b) provides: 
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. do not become operative, 
however, if the United States Arbitration Act is found to be inap-
plicable to the specific judicial proceeding. For example, in Com-
mercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co.,·o the re-
spondent's answering statement to the demand for arbitration 
contained a notice to take the depositions of five of the petitioner's 
employees in Louisiana.·1 The court subsequently granted the peti-
tioner's motion to vacate the notice on the basis that Rule 81(a)(3) 
applied only to "proceedings" under the Act, which were in con-
nection with a stay for an action brought on an issue with refer-
ence to arbitration, or confirmation or vacatur of an arbitral 
award"lI In addition the court noted, by its agreement to arbitrate 
rather than litigate disputes, that respondent elected voluntarily to 
avail himself of the procedures unique and peculiar to the arbitra-
tion forum"s 
In Foremost Yarn Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, Inc." the court dis-
missed an action for a preliminary injunction restraining an arbi-
tration proceeding where discovery had been sought pursuant to 
Rule 81(a)(3). The court held that Rule 81(a)(3) relates only to 
specific proceedings brought under the United States Arbitration 
Act. Relying upon Commercial Solvents, the court observed that 
the discovery rules provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are not available to parties in pursuit of their remedy, vis-a-
vis arbitration"!! 
Although it appears that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
.Would not become operative where parties have agreed in advance 
or have stipulated to resolve their grievance in the arbitral forum 
as opposed to court, it is not clear whether courts would be less 
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the 
books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein; but the court, 
upon motion made promptly and in' any event at or before the time specified in 
the subpoena for compliance therewith, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if 
it is unreasonable and oppressive or (2) condition denial of the motion upon the 
advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasona-
ble cost of producing the books, papers, documents, or tangible things. 
40. 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
41. [d. at 360. 
42. [d. at 361. 
43. [d. 
44. 25 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1960). 
45. [d. at 11. 
. . 
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likely to intercede on an enforcement petition where the arbitrator 
has exercised subpoena power pursuant to the United States Arbi-
tration Act. There is, however, some case law which supports such 
exercise of authority by an arbitrator. In Local Lodge 1746, Inter-
national Association of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., the 
federal district court ordered an employer to produce an investi-
gatory file for an in camera inspection by the arbitrator.·e The 
subpoena was served pursuant to state law, and the court held that 
it would act sua sponte to require the employer to produce the 
investigatory files since it possesses the concurrent authority under 
the United States Arbitration Act "to enforce procedures attend-
ant upon orderly consumation of the arbitration hearing."" While 
the court indicated tht the arbitrator had the right to secure all 
documents and to determine their relevance, the court intimated 
that the subpoena should have been issued pursuant to the United 
States Arbitration Act in the first instance. 
It can be argued that the federal policy favoring labor arbitra-
tion is furthered by the utilization of discovery procedures. The 
discovery procedures afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure would result in a more expedient disposition of frivolous 
claims and decrease the necessity of adjournment to overcome the 
element of surprise. In discharge or discipline grievances, there is 
often the need to examine the grievant's work record or the work 
records of other employees who were not subject to the same pen-
alty. To provide a full and fair hearing on the merits, the arbitra-
tor must be permitted to require the production of records and 
documents germane to the issues in dispute. This policy considera-
tion has been adopted by one federal court which relied exclusively 
on the policy favoring labor arbitration to uphold an order of dis-
covery, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.·s 
C. The Uniform Arbitration Act 
Section 1 of the Uniform Arbitration Act49 establishes the pa-
46. 329 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D. Conn. 1971). See also Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc. v. 
Local 337, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 363 F. Supp. 1351; ABA SUBCOMM. ON LABOR 
ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 14 (Feb. 16, 1979). 
47. 329 F. Supp. at 286. 
48. Asbestos Workers, Local 66 v. Leona Lee Corp., 76 L.R.R.M. 2026 (5th Cir. 1970). 
49. The Act was adopted by the National Conference of the Commissioners of Uniform 
State Laws in 1955 and amended in 1956. It was approved by the House of Delegates of the 
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rameters of the arbitration to include any existing controversy or 
controversy thereafter arising between the parties. Such an agree-
ment is deemed to be valid and irrevocable, except upon such 
grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of the contract. 
The Act applies to arbitration between employers and employees 
or between their respective representatives.GO 
Section 7 of the Act provides arbitrators with the power to issue 
"subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the production 
of books, records, documents and other evidence .... "Gl and per-
mits depositions to be taken under certain circumstances. Inas-
much as no absolute uniformity exists between this statute and 
other modern state arbitration statutes, it is sufficient to say that 
the Act has served as a precursor for state legislatures considering 
the implementation of a modern arbitration statute. Ill! 
D. Labor Arbitration in Michigan 
The Michigan arbitration statuteG8 is closely patterned after the 
Uniform Arbitration Act with the major exception, exclusion of la-
American Bar Association in 1955 and 1956. States which have enacted the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act, in whole or in part, include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,. illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wiscon-
sin, Wyoming. For the corresponding statutory citations for these states, see note 2 supra. 
50. UNIFORM ARBITRATION Acr § 1. 
51. Section 7 of the Act provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The arbitrators may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for 
the production of books, records, documents and other evidence, and shall have 
the power to administer oaths. Subpoenas so issued shall be served, and upon 
application to the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced, in the manner 
provided by law for the service and enforcement of subpoenas in civil cases. 
(b) On application of a party and for use as evidence, the arbitrators may permit 
a deposition to be taken, in the manner and upon the terms designated by the 
arbitrators, of a witness who cannot be subpoenaed or is unable to attend the 
hearing. 
52. An interesting comment can be made in regard to the Uniform Arbitration Act en-
acted in the State of New York. Pursuant to this statute, arbitrators and attorneys of record 
maintain the power to issue a subpoena. Prior to the revisions of the Civil Practice Act, 
replaced by the Civil Practice Law and Rules in 1963, an arbitrator in a common law pro-
ceeding was specifically authorized to issue subpoenas. See Page, Subpoena Practice in Ar-
bitration, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 6, 1976 at 1, col. 1. 
53. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001-.5035 (1976 & Supp. 1979). 
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bor arbitration by collective contract. II. A split of authority exists 
as to the specific application to be accorded the labor arbitration 
exclusion. 
In Stadel v. Granger Brothers, Inc.,1I1I the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals held that a contract regulating the relationship between a 
contractor and builder, which contained a provision for arbitration 
to settle controversies thereafter arising, was intended to encom-
pass arbitration of employer-employee disputes.lili The court struck 
down the defendant's argument that the arbitration agreement was 
not enforceable because it was not an instrument separate from 
the main contract, as mandated by the statutory arbitration provi-
sion.1I7 The court distinguished contracts between employers and 
employees, and contracts applying to the construction industry (al-
though the latter would subject controversies arising out of the re-
lationship, including those which sound in tort, to arbitration). 
The policy consideration undergirding the decision of the court 
was to facilitate and foster the "prompt adjustment and settlement 
of claims. "118 
Statutory collective contracts, however, vary substantially from 
contracts negotiated exclusively between a' single employee and a 
single employer. It has been asserted that the employment rela-
tionship in a collective setting does not establish the employee as a 
direct beneficiary. lie Instead, the affected employees become third-
54. Section 600.5001(3) of the Michigan statute states: "[t)he provisions of this chapter 
shall not apply to collective contracts between employers and employees or associations of 
employees in respect to terms or conditions of employment." 
55. 4 Mich. App. 250, 144 N.W.2d 609 (1960). 
56. [d. at 255, 144 N.W.2d at 610-11. 
57. [d, at 259-60, 144 N.W.2d at 613. 
58. [d. at 255-56, 144 N.W.2d at 611. The policy favoring arbitration where a dispute has 
a colorable basis to proceed in the forum is firmly established in Michigan. If the arbitration 
clause includes the asserted dispute, courts resolve any doubts regarding arbitrability in 
favor of arbitration. See Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Dist. No.6 v. Kaleva-Norman 
Dickson School 'feachers' Ass'n, 393 Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975); Campbell v. Com-
munity Service Ins. Co., 73 Mich. App. 416, 251 N.W.2d 609 (1977); Chippewa Valley 
Schools v. Hill, 62 Mich. App. 116, 62 N.W.2d 208, appeal denied, 395 Mich. 806 (1975). 
Reference need not be made to a specific arbitration statute for an arbitration clause to be 
enforceable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in assessing the 
propriety of an injunction in the absence of a reference to a specific arbitration statute, 
determined that section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act was sufficiently broad to 
encompass a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. See Galt v. Libbey-
Owens Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1967). 
59. See Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal Sys-
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party beneficiaries, and the rights and duties created by the em-
ployment relationship concern only the contracting parties: the 
union, and the employer. It is the collectively negotiated contract 
which is specifically exempt from the statutory arbitration em-
chan ism in Michigan. However, this type of contract which con-
tains a clause for arbitration arguably supports, via reliance upon 
other statutes and powers, requests for formal discovery. 
The Michigan arbitration statute is supplemented by Rule 769 
of the General Court Rules which provides that: " [o]n application 
of a party and for use as evidence, the arbitrators may permit a 
deposition to be taken, in the manner and upon the terms desig-
nated by the arbitrators, of a witness who cannot be subpoenaed or 
is unable to attend the hearing."so The initial amendatory provi-
sion of the arbitration statute provided for witnesses to be com-
pelled to appear by subpoena issued by any justice of the peace. 
The promulgation of the General Court Rule failed to shed light as 
to the scope of the subpoena power but instead, has successfully 
obfuscated the issue inasmuch as the applicable rules do not give 
the arbitrator explicit subpoena power in any type of arbitration 
proceeding enforceable under the statute. What the rule does pro-
vide is a grant of authority to an arbitrator to describe the manner 
in which a deposition may be taken, when the person to be de-
posed is unable to attend the hearing. Thus, not only are collective 
contracts exempt from the arbitration statute, but assuming argu-
endo that an individual employer-employee contract is involved, a 
further hurdle to overcome would be the restrictive dimension of 
Rule 769. 
It would appear then that tl:te only well-recognized basis upon 
which to assert non-restrictive subpoena power in Michigan is 
where a collective controversy impacts upon interstate commerce. 
Here, the United States Arbitration Act would become operative; 
decisional law supports the proposition that an arbitrator can exe-
cute a subpoena and have reasonable assurance that it will be en-
forced by the courts.S1 In Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc. v. Local 
tem. 39 MICH. L. REv. 1110. 1135-53 (1941). 
60. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 769.5(2). 
61. See Great Scott Supermarkets. Inc. v. Local 337. International Bhd. of Teamsters. 
363 F. Supp. 1351 (arbitrator is not bound by the Federal Rules of Procedure and did not 
exceed his powers by issuing a subpoena). 
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337, International Brotherhood of Teamsters82 a federal district 
court in Michigan found that the United States Arbitration Act 
gave the arbitrator authority to subpoena documents. The em-
ployer applied for enforcement of an award by the arbitrator who 
had issued a subpoena requiring the production of grievance panel 
hearing reports made by the secretary of the panel who was also 
the attorney for the union. The district court held that the arbitra-
tor was not bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, having 
determined the reports did not constitute the work-product of the 
attorney for the union.88 
In addition to an express grant of authority provided by the 
United States Arbitration Act, arbitrators have been known to 
supplement this grant by capitalizing on their inherent authority 
to rule on procedural questions to determine the propriety of a dis-
covery request.84 In 1971, this authority was given formal judicial 
recognition in Local 757, International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. Borden, Inc. 86 The court held that the employer was required to 
comply with a subpoena duces tecum obtained from the state court 
by the union, requiring the production of certain books and 
records for use in the arbitration proceeding, as the issue of 
whether said production should be ordered was a procedural mat-
ter for an arbitrator to decide.88 
Further recognition of such authority was established in 1976 
when a federal district court entered an order enforcing a sub-
poena issued by the arbitrator in a proceeding involving three dis-
charge grievances.s7 The petition to enforce the subpoena clearly 
asserted that the respondent was in possession of facts and infor-
mation relevant to the matter and essential for proper resolution of 
the dispute. 
62. 363 F. Supp. 1351. 
63. [d. at 1354-55. 
64. Mark Kahn, a prominent Michigan labor arbitrator, has typically relied upon such 
authority. In Pennsalt Chem. Corp., (unpublished AAA Case No. 16-15, 1961) the company 
was obligated to respond to the union's request for the point rating for each factor of the job 
. where the contract gave the union the right "by use of the grievance procedure and arbitra-
tion" to review the company's determination of evaluation points for new or changed jobs. 
See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555-59 (1964). 
65. 78 L.R.R.M. 2398 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
66. Id. at 2400. 
67. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Local 876, Retail Store Employees, (unpublished AAA Case 
No. 5430 0766 76). 
HeinOnline -- 1979 Det. C.L. Rev. 591 1979
1979] Subpoenas in Labor Arbitration 591 
The courts, in sustaining an arbitrator's power to issue a sub-
poena, are generally guided by the standard of relevancy, material-
ity and pertinency before determining that a proper case exists for 
ordering discovery.88 The materiality and relevancy must be estab-
lished simultaneously with the request.89 Fishing expeditions are 
no more tolerated in arbitration than in litigation; if the request 
for production of documentary material is deemed to be harass-
ment, arbitrators and courts alike will restrict the use of the 
subpoena.7o 
The actual propriety of a subpoena is for the court to deter-
mine.71 A person who takes it upon himself not to abide with the 
command of a subpoena, regardless of miscognizance of the law, 
does so at the risk of being characterized as a "contemner." In 
Oceanic Transport Corp. v. Alcoa Steamship CO.72 a federal dis-
trict court in New York denied a motion to punish for contempt 
and vacated the subpoena of a witness who had been ordered to 
appear and produce certain documents.78 The basis of the denial 
given by the court was not one striking at the authority of the arbi-
trator to issue subpoenas, but rather the court's ability to compel 
the attendance of a witness if it is a proper case, the documents in 
the witness' possession are relevant and material. In this particular 
instance, the court found the documents were not material to the 
arbitration proceeding, and consequently not a proper case for the 
issuance of a subpoena.74 
III. THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL CONFLICT-SHOULD LABOR 
ARBITRATORS INVOKE FORMAL DISCOVERY PROCEDURES? 
A troublesome area in the labor arbitration process is the scope 
of an individual arbitrator's or arbitration panel's power and au-
thority. In the main, arbitrators follow one of two schools of 
68. See In Re Sun-Ray Cloak Co., 256 App. Div. 620, 11 N.Y.S.2d 202, rehearing denied, 
257 App. Div. 815, 12 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1939) (the writ was vacated only on the basis that the 
subpoena duces tecum requiring the release of all "books and records" was too broad). 
69. See Local 99, ILGWU v. Clarise Sportswear Co., 44 Misc. 2d 913, 255 N.Y.S.2d 282 
(Sup. Ct. 1964). 
70. See O. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 132 (1973). 
71. [d. 
72. 129 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. N.Y. 1954). 
73. [d. at 161. 
74. [d. 
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thought: (1) those who subscribe to the application of federal and 
state law where questions of public policy are inextricably inter-
twined with the dispute arising out of the collective bargaining 
agreement, and (2) those who do not believe that federal or state 
law applicability is a matter for the arbitrator, and who, deplore 
arbitral excursions into areas where no real "expertise to vindicate 
statutory rights exist."75 Those adhering to the latter perspective 
assert that an arbitrator's authority is derived from the four cor-
ners of the collective bargaining agreement, and if the parties 
wanted the arbitrator to consider outside law, as opposed to the 
"laws of the workplace," then the parties would negotiate such a 
clause into their contract. 
Those arbitrators, on the other hand, who subscribe to the for-
mer perspective have a discernible tendency to engage in arbitral 
activism, the arbitral equivalent to judicial activism. This degree of 
activism generally spills over into the area of discovery, where the 
arbitrator is faced with imposing benchmarks for collective cooper-
ation or the increased likelihood that an adverse award against the 
recalcitrant party may be entered. Arbitrators then, who· pattern 
the conduct of an arbitration hearing after an adjudicatory process 
with its inherent formalities, are much more inclined to exercise 
those same formalities, to the extent permissible by law, in the ar-
bitral forum. What follows are the opinions of prominent arbitra-
tors relating to arbitral subpoena power. All whose opinions have 
been cited responded to a single question: "is it your opinion tbat 
labor arbitrators maintain the authority to issue subpoenas to com-
pel the attendance of witnesses or to require the production of doc-
uments and records?" None of the arbitrators have been classifed 
as "activists" or "non-activists." 
Nathan Lipson78 
"There are two points of view in regard to arbitral subpoena 
power; the first is subpoenas should issue automatically and even 
ex parte upon request; the other is that the arbitrator should care-
fully scrutinize the issuance of subpoenas. 
75. Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The Common Law of the Shop v. 
External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65, 65 (1977). 
76. Nathan Lipson is an Associate Professor of Labor Law at the University of Detroit 
Law School. He is a permanent umpire for the Freemont plant of the Kelsey-Hayes Corp., 
the United Steelworkers, the McLouth Steel Corp. and the United Steelworkers of America. 
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I generally prefer not to issue subpoenas, and that production of 
witnesses, and materials be consensually arranged. That point of 
view applies to both subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum. I have 
concern for the relationship of the parties that transcends· the 
problems of a particular arbitration case, and a complicated arbi-
tration matter can strain the relationship of the parties and fur-
ther denigrate it. Where issuance of a subpoena involves cooperat-
ion, I will ask the parties to consent to subpoenas prior to the 
hearing. If the parties are unable to resolve the matter internally, 
then the arbitrator should be entitled to exercise discretion, but 
only after hearing argument. For example, a recent case which I 
arbitrated between the Duluth Herald and the newspaper union 
involved the discharge of a district circulation manager." The em-
ployer claimed throughout the course of the proceedings that the 
circulation manager was discharged for neglect of duty and failure 
to perform in a proper manner. The position of the union was that 
the grievant did not deviate. from the established norm and this 
could be proven if they had access to the records. It was the posi-
tion of this arbitrator that if convinced it was relevant, the produc-
tion of the records would be ordered. I encouraged the parties to 
resolve all record production matters, recognizing full well that the 
failure to produce could allow for National Labor Relations ~oard 
intercession as a result of 8(a)(5) charges.78 The parties resolved 
77. Newspaper Guild of the Twin Cities and the Duluth Hearld (undesignated grievance 
and unpublished case subject to private arbitration). 
78. A Section 8(a)(5) violation, as established by the National Labor Relations Act, con-
stitutes the basis of an unfair labor practice charge where parties have failed to bargain in 
good faith. A leading case on this issue is NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). 
The issue presented on appeal to the Supreme Court was "whether the Board must await an 
arbitrator's determination of the relevancy of the requested information before it can en-
force the Union's statutory rights under § 8(a)(5)." [d. at 436. The United States Supreme 
Court upheld the power of the Board to find a § 8(a)(5) violation where there was a failure 
to provide information for an arbitrable grievance. The Court advanced strong policy con-
siderations buttressing the necessity of discovery in arbitration. 
Thus, the assertion of jurisdiction by the Board in this case in no way threatens 
the power which the parties have given the arbitrator to make binding interpreta-
tions of the labor agreement. 
Far from intruding upon the preserve of the arbitrator, the Board's action was in 
aid of the arbitral process. Arbitration can function properly only if the grievance 
procedures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious claims. For if all claims origi-
nally initiated as grievances had to be processed through to arbitration, the sys-
tem would be woefully overburdened. Yet, that is precisely what the respondent's 
restrictive view would require. It would force the union to take a grievance all the 
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the problem between themselves prior to the scheduled oral 
hearing. 
In the event the parties cannot work their problems out and a 
subpoena must be issued, I will not issue it on an ex parte basis. 
Statutes are drafted so the arbitrator will carefully consider 
whether he should subpoena. An adversary to the issuance of a 
subpoena should have a hearing so that problems or objections 
may be aired. In some situations, the arbitrator must be aware that 
the collective bargaining sphere is one where gamesmanship often 
is employed. 
There are many nefarious possibilities when discovery requests 
are made. The employer can use such a request as a fishing expedi-
tion to delve into internal union affairs unrelated to the arbitra-
tion. By the same token, a union might be looking for an opportu-
nity to get at confidential company information unrelated to 
arbitration issues. Therefore, an arbitrator must make sure that re-
quests for records are clearly relevant and necessary to the hearing. 
There are situations where even relevancy should not be the sole 
benchmark for the issuance of a subpoena, namely if potential 
harm outweighs the good. For example, a violent grievant may be 
pitted against a rather docile witness which could result in possible 
post-hearing complications as a direct consequence of requiring the 
presence of the witness, even though the witness is material to the 
case. The key to the discovery and witness production process is 
the balancing of due process against the labor relations process. "'19 
Harry H. Platt80 
"The matter of subpoenaing witnesses or requiring the produc-
way through to arbitration without providing the opportunity to evaluate the mer-
its of the claim. The expense of arbitration might be placed upon the union only 
for it to learn that the machines had been relegated to the junk heap. Nothing in 
federal labor requires such a result. 
[d. at 438-39. See also Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 88, 98 L.R.R.M. 1022 (1978) 
where a charging party union challenged the failure of the employer to disclose information 
relevant to the preparation of the grievance, subsequent to an arbitral determination that 
the respondent was duty bound to release the information and issued a subpoena thereon. 
79. Interview with Nathan Lipson, Associate Professor of Law, Univ. of Detroit, in De-
troit (March 21, 1979). 
SO. Harry H. Platt, is chairman of the Board of Arbitration, Consumers Power Company 
and Utility Workers Union. He is also designated as a neutral referee under agreements 
between major airlines and the airline pilots association. Other "chairs" include the Interna-
tional Board of Arbitration, the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the Inter-
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tion of books and records is really a matter for the courts, unless 
there is a clear provision to the contrary granting such activity to 
an arbitrator. Although' as an arbitrator, I have signed subpoenas 
upon request, the legality or 'Validity is something I do not vouch 
for. There is no warranty, and certainly there are no contempt 
powers. 
The arbitrator can encourage the parties to work out their differ-
ences pertaining to discovery, once advised that such differences 
exist. If there continues to be a failure on the part of one party to 
produce the material or witness relevant to the resolution of the 
controversy, then it could very well cause the arbitrator to estab-
lish more than an inference of culpability. Recently, I heard a se-
niority integration case. There was a substantial amount of quar-
reling and devisive confrontation between the parties. The 
company attorney would not relinquish the requisite exhibits, 
which on the face of the claim, were clearly relevant and material 
to the dispute. I suggested that the other party was entitled to 
have the material and to introduce it into evidence. Otherwise, I 
would be in a position to make certain inferences based on the 
company's reluctance to comply with the request. The next morn-
ing, the exhibits were released by the company and were properly 
introduced into evidence."81 
Alan Walt82 
"An arbitrator in the private sector under federally enacted leg-
islation has the right to issue a subpoena, but it is still within his 
discretion to do so. While issuance of a subpoena or a subpoena 
duces tecum might be central to resolve a controverted area, the 
requesting parties should establish the need for that legal process 
since the parties are responsible for fashioning their case and gath-
ering the evidence. In the public sector, the issuance of process 
may be controlled by state statute. Here too, the arbitrator can 
exercise a significant amount of discretion. The arbitrator, how-
ever, cannot enforce his or her subpoena. As a result, it might be 
preferable under certain circumstances to request that subpoenas. 
national Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union of North America. 
81. Telephone interview with Harry H. Platt, arbitrator, in Detroit (March 22, 1979). 
82. Alan Walt, arbitrating in various industries, is a fact-finder for the Michigan Em-
ployment Relations Commission. He serves on the Arbitration Panel for the Detroit News 
Publishers Association and the Detroit Printing Pressmen's Union No. 13. 
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be secured from a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the first 
instance. 
In Michigan, in the public sector, the statute exempts labor, and 
to my knowledge, there are no court holdings opposing an arbitra-
tor's right to issue subpoenas in labor cases under the court rules. 
Of course, the labor arbitration rules of the American Arbitration 
Association do grant the necessary authority in cases administered 
by that organization. The basic tenet which I strongly adhere to is 
fair dealing; I do not issue subpoenas without putting the other 
party on notice. "83 
Robert G. Howlett84 
"There is nothing in the Michigan Labor Relations Mediation 
Act which authorizes an arbitrator to issue a subpoena. Section 
9(d) provides for arbitration of labor disputes.8 & The statute and 
court rules which cover commercial arbitration do provide for the 
issuance of subpoenas. 
The United States Arbitration Act which is applicable to enter-
prises in interstate commerce, does provide for the issuance of sub-
poenas. There is, however, a split of authority between the circuits 
as to whether the United States Arbitration Act is applicable to 
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements; the United 
States Supreme Court has never passed upon the question. The 
Sixth Circuit, by dicta, has stated that the Act does cover collec-
tive bargaining arbitration.88 
I have, on a number of occasions, issued subpoenas in private 
sector cases under the United States Arbitration Act. I have never 
I 
had a case where the subpoena has not been obeyed. I also note 
that there is nothing in the public sector similar to the United 
States Arbitration Act authorizing an arbitrator' to issue a sub-
poena. Clearly, the Act does not apply to any public sector situa-
tion. I have issued subpoenas in public sector cases-patently, 
83. Telephone interview with Alan Walt, arbitrator, in Detroit (March 22, 1979). 
84. Robert G. Howlett, is a partner in the law firm of Schmidt, Howlett, Van't Hof, Snell 
& Vana in Grand Rapids, Michigan. He is chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations 
Board, a position he has occupied since 1964. . 
85. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 423.9(d) (1978). 
86. See Chattanooga Mailers Union, Local No. 92 V. Chattanooga News-Free Press Co., 
524 F.2d 1305 (6th Cir. 1975). 
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without authority. However, they have always been obeyed."87 
William M. Ellmann88 
"I assume that inherent in arbitral rights is the requirement that 
I sign any and all subpoenas which may expedite the hearing and 
ultimate resolution of the matter presented to me. In the event 
that the subpoena is not honored, the arbitrator can adjourn the 
hearing to permit time for the subpoena to be issued under court 
aegis, although this seems altogether too time consuming; appar-
ently, it may become necessary under appropriate circumstances. 
All other witnesses may be heard beforehand. Thus, the hearing is 
not really delayed. "8e 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The evolution of labor management collective bargaining has 
been sustained by pragmatic and intrinsic considerations rather 
than the theoretical.eo As a by-product of this stimulation, there 
has been less reliance upon statuatory criteria and more upon con-
tractual standards as bargained for between the parties. 
Several important policy considerations come to bear upon the 
prospect of arbitral discovery. First and foremost is the assump-
tion which is made regarding the general unavailability of discov-
ery as an incident to the arbitration proceeding.91 Here, it is ar-
gued that the parties have opted for a more informal and 
expedited process, and to utilize discovery apparatus at this junc-
ture would jeopardize and undermine the intent of the parties. In 
this vein a Michigan arbitrator, in response to a request to issue a 
subpoena, observed that he had no power, either under the United 
States Arbitration Act nor any other statute to issue such a docu-
ment. In his decision he stated: 
Moreover, the fact-finding process in arbitration is really not equivalent 
to judicial fact-finding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not 
87. Telephone interview with Robert G. Howlett, arbitrator, in Detroit (March 23, 1979). 
88. William Marshall Ellmann is a commissioner for the Michigan Employment Rela-
tions Commission. 
89. Telephone interview with William M. Ellman, arbitrator, in Detroit (March 23, 
1979). 
90. See Jones, The Assertion of Federal Power in Labor Arbitration-The Example of 
Arbitral Discovery, 116 PA. L. REv. 830 (1960). 
91. [d. at 835. 
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as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and the rights and 
procedures common to Civil Trials . . . such as the compulsory process 
... are often severely limited or unavailable ... Indeed it is the infor-
mality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, 
inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution.9s 
The adoption of formal discovery might well chill the free flow of 
information and unduly formalize rather than simplify labor arbi-
tration. Additional support for this position is found in Cavanaugh 
v. McConnel & CO.93 wherein the court stated: 
We also feel that arbitration, once undertaken, should continue freely 
without being subjected to a judicial restraint which could tend to render 
the proceedings neither one thing nor the other, but transform them into 
a hybrid, part judicial and part arbitrational. We also might add that it 
seems somewhat incongruous to resort to judicial help for pre-hearing 
discovery after a voluntary understanding has left the entire matter to 
the determination of arbitrators.e• 
What would be jeopardized in this situation would be the relation-
ship of the parties; discovery lubricated with the element of com-
pulsion is deemed to be incompatible with a bilaterally negotiated 
contract premised upon consent. 
On the other hand, it could be established with equal cogency 
that the mere existence of the consensual elements in the collective 
bargaining setting support a contractual commitment to disclose 
information. Moreover, the disclosure of relevant information can 
occur without the need to replicate in arbitration the formalized 
and complex discovery mechanisms permitted in litigation.BII Addi-
tionally, it cannot unequivocally be said that silence in a collective 
bargaining agreement demonstrates the parties' intention not to be 
compelled to make disclosures through discovery. Obligations of 
92. Arbitrator Howard C. Cole's response constituted a ruling as to whether he maintains 
the power to issue the subpoena requested by the Union. (unpublished AAA Case No. 54 30 
077773). 
93. 357 Mass. 452, 258 N.E.2d 561 (1970). 
94. Id. at 457, 258 N.E.2d at 564. 
95. The requirement to disclose information was most recently incorporated into the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, which established ad-
ministrative practices and procedures for federal civil service employees. Section 7132 sets 
forth the basic practice to be followed by the general counselor a member of the Federal 
Labor Relations Authority who seeks, in aid of resolving the dispute, to subpoena witnesses 
or compel the production of documentary material. Provisions for enforcement proceedings 
in the event of contumacy or failure to comply with the issuance of a subpoena are likewise 
established therein. 
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discovery may impliedly be integrated into the conceptual contrac-
tual framework. Absent such obligations of disclosure, the parties' 
own concern for expediency and efficient resolution of the matter 
in controversy might well require the interjection of well-defined 
discovery requirements. 
The law clearly imposes a statutory duty to bargain, and it can 
be argued that this duty concomitantly imposes an obligation to 
disclose data relevant and material for the resolution of the dis-
pute. The collective agreement, deemed to have been entered into 
consensually, requires the parties to abide by the obligations im-
posed upon them by law, including the necessary disclosure with 
respect to hours, wages and conditions of employment. Although 
the authority to administer discovery can be expressly withheld 
from an arbitrator, the main problem arises when the agreement is 
silent as to the prospect of discovery. One commentator concludes 
that "disclosure through the grievance procedure is the deductible 
intent of the parties when their agreement is silent on the subject 
of arbitral discovery. The arbitrator who issues an arbitral discov-
ery order in appropriate circumstances is functionipg within the 
ambit of their interest."9B 
The posture of the United States Supreme Court regarding arbi-
tral discovery, has vacillated from non-recognition to acceptance. 
For example, in 1924, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unani-
mous Court in FTC v. American Tobacco Company,97 denounced 
as "contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search 
through all the respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant, in the 
hope that something will turn up. "98 He also declared that it would 
"sweep all our traditions into the fire ... [were] fishing expedi-
tions into private papers" to be tolerated.99 Later, in the famous 
case of Hickman v. Taylor,lOo an equally enlightened Court held 
"[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve 
to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his 
opponent's case.m01 Certainly the safeguard procedures available 
in civil litigation could become operative in the arbitral forum, and 
96. See Jones, supra note 90, at 838. 
97. 264 U.S. 298 (1924). 
98. [d. at 306. 
99. [d. 
100. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
101. [d. at 507. 
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the possible likelihood of abuse and embarrassment could be suffi-
ciently laid to rest. 
CONCLUSION 
The attitude of courts relative to the presumption of favoring 
arbitration has been given wide-spread judicial recognition. It is 
not as well-settled that this presumption extends to include the 
formalized discovery conduct regularly engaged in by arbitrators 
who derive their power from precarious bases. 101 
If formalized discovery is to be given credence it can only be 
accomplished via the reliance upon the persuasive policy consider-
ations herein set forth. Discovery in labor arbitration is inherent 
within the conceptual legal and collective contractual framework. 
With the increased use of arbitration as a by-product of 
mushrooming unionization, it is reasonable to predict that labor 
arbitrators faced with granting a discovery request would extend 
their arbitral authority to the most permissible boundary, and act 
affirmatively on such requests where it is deemed to be material to 
the resolution of the dispute. 
Where meaningful collective relationships exist, compliance with 
reasonable discovery requests would naturally flow from such a re-
lationship, and therefore obviate the necessity of third-party inter-
vention. A strained collective relationship should certainly not be 
subject to any less legal protection; it is equally important for the 
principles of fairness and justice to prevail. While an express grant 
of authority to invoke formal discovery might not exist in those 
interactions falling outside the aegis of the United States Arbitra-
tion Act, procedural questions which bear directly upon the deter-
mination of a matter in controversy nevertheless fall within the 
ambit of arbitral authority. It would appear, therefore, that more 
potential for abuse exists where an arbitrator does not exercise im-
plied authority to issue subpoenas for the production of records or 
102. Numerous arbitrators in Michigan have honored requests to issue subpoenas in 
public sector disputes. By the great weight of authority. arbitrators if challenged, would 
have to overcome three major hurdles: (1) the collective labor contract exclusion as provided 
for in MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.5001(3); (2) the inapplicability of the United States 
Arbitration Act which requires a condition precedent that the dispute arise out of or affect 
interstate commerce; and (3) the inapplicability of AAA Rule 28 which permits an arbitrator 
to subpoena, if so authorized by law,· assuming that the dispute is subject to AAA 
jurisdiction. 
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to compel the attendance of a material witness. The exercise of 
such authority is preferable over permitting a protraction of the 
hearing by a recalcitrant adversary. Certainly this power should be 
exercised to augment arbitral procedures whenever it appears nec-
essary to promote a full and fair hearing, and to reach a just and 
equitable solution. 
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